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LITIGATION AGAINST A STATE TRADER - A NO-WIN
CONTEST
Jon Magnusson*
A litigant who sues a state trading corporation for eight years
through two trials, four appeals, 2 and three certiorari denials, 3 and
then finally wins a judgment for $411,203.72, but is unable to collect
on his judgment, might feel a little discouraged about the fairness
of a principle of law that denies him a right to recovery.4 The principle is "sovereign immunity;" a sovereign state and its property,
without its consent, are immune from the adjudicative processes of
the courts in another sovereign state.- In traditional international
law, it does not matter what kind of activity the state is engaged
in; the mere fact that it is a sovereign state entitles it to immunity
regardless of what it does.'
The state trading corporation (hereinafter "state trader") is the
agency of a state's government that engages in commercial trading,
but is also organized in a manner comparable with private business
enterprises in the United States. It is entitled to the immunity of
its principal, the sovereign state.
* B.S., University of Virginia, 1935; J.D., George Washington University, 1937. Expert/Consultant for the U.S. Department of Transportation.
1. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc., 300 F. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1924);
Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc., 299 F. 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
2. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930);
Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc., 32 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1929); Kunglig
Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. National City Bank, 20 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1927); Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. United States, 19 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1927).
3. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 282 U.S. 896 (1931); Kunglig
Jamvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc., 280 U.S. 579 (1929); Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. National City Bank, 275 U.S. 497 (1927) (per curiam).
4. A negotiated settlement for $150,000 was accepted by the Swedish government in 1933.
However, this settlement was a matter of grace made in acknowledgment of Sweden's sovereign immunity, not a matter of right in acknowledgment of the jurisdiction of American
courts or their judgments.
5. See, e.g., Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926); The Schooner
Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 478 (1812); Aerotrade, Inc. v. Republic of Haiti,
376 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See generally 45 Am. JUR. 2d InternationalLaw § 46
(1969); Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 322 (1969).
6. Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864,
869, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1966). The basic principle of the absolute independence of
states has long been an established principle of law. See, e.g., The Parlement Belge, 5 P.D.
197 (Ct. App. 1880).
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The sovereign immunity principle is consistent with United
States law. 7 The consequences of the defense of immunity in litigation are that a sovereign state does not have to accept service of a
complaint or respond to a complaint against it or its agents. Nor,
absent the state's permission, may its property be attached at the
outset of litigation to obtain in rem jurisdiction.8 Nor does it have
to produce evidence in a trial, thereby preventing adjudication.'
Finally, its property may not be attached for sale in a levy in execution of a judgment against it.' 0 A plaintiff who has this principle
applied at any stage of litigation against a state trader has been
denied justice because his complaint has not been heard, has been
dismissed, has not been considered on its merits for lack of evidence
or has not been redressed for proven damages since the state's property is exempt from execution.
This article will show that current law applied in adjudicating
wrongdoing by state traders against American citizens denies justice
by failing to provide a means to enforce judgments. The failure
exists in spite of legislation and court decisions attempting to eliminate the unfairness. These failures indicate there is a need for some
kind of action. Since legislative action or a reformation of judicial
thinking in the United States will not be adequate to solve a problem of such international dimensions, executive action through the
Department of State will be necessary. There is no way to avoid an
inadequacy of justice without prior executive action through international negotiation. Three propositions are accepted as fundamental causes for past failures, and as imperatives for executive action.
The first is accepted as a practical requirement for fairness in any
adjudication, and the second and third are historically established,
unavoidable facts of international relations. First, fairness in any
judicial proceeding requires that the plaintiffs be able to recover
damages or have some other remedy for wrongful actions by state
7. See Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d
864 (1966).
8. Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943). The Court stated that the question in
such cases was "whether the jurisdiction which the court had already acquired . . . should
have been relinquished in conformity to an overriding principle of substantive law." Id. at
588.
9. See Montship Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Bd., 295 F.2d 147 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
10. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc., 299 F. 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). See
notes 1-4 supra and accompanying text.
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traders causing them damage or injury. Second, a sovereign state,
including its agencies, is legally equal to all other sovereign states."
Third, a sovereign state and its agencies may not be compelled by
another sovereign state to do anything except by consent, either in
a treaty or some other form of agreement. The third proposition is
a consequence of the second, and in both cases the state trader is
considered to be an agency of the state, whether organized as a
corporation or in any other form.
The courts, Congress, the Department of State and commentators
have been trying for many years to eliminate the unfairness which
these principles work on injured parties by developing rationalizations for holding foreign states liable in our courts without their
express consent. The rationalizations have generally sought to show
that consent is somehow to be implied in certain cases, such as
where the principle has become part of the general body of international law, other parts of which the state has consented to abide by.
Another rationale is that in those cases where a state engages in
nongovernmental acts such as commercial trading, either directly,
or through a state trader, it is no longer acting in a sovereign capacity and is therefore no longer entitled to immunity.' 2 The proponents
of this "restrictive theory" of sovereign immunity argue that the
maintenance and advancement of economic welfare by a state in
time of peace is sufficiently lacking in public purpose to be nongovernmental and reduces the sovereign, in so far as it engages in commercial activity, to the status of a nonimmune private person who
becomes subject to the judicial power of another state. According
to this view, the state's commercial activities are not entitled to the
protection of the second and third propositions noted above.
The Supreme Court has dealt with this argument and has rejected
11. This proposition is proclaimed as a principle in the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 122-24,
U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
12. See, e.g., Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes,
336 F.2d 354, 357-62 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965). A more restrictive theory
had been suggested earlier in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 478,
488 (1812):
[T]here is a manifest distinction between the private property of the person who
happens to be a prince and the military force which supports the sovereign power, and
maintains the dignity and the independence of a nation.
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it, at least as to state-owned ships. 3 In the principal case, the S.S.
Pesarowas engaged in commercial transport," and the plaintiff was
suing for damages to a shipment of olive oil incurred while en route
to the United States. The plaintiff sought jurisdiction at the outset
of his case, as well as some assurance of collecting on any judgment
by a libel in rem against the ship. The ship was owned and operated
by the Italian government. After acknowledging the commercial
character of the activity, the Court responded to arguments that the
sovereign immunity doctrine did not apply to the facts by noting:
We know of no international usage which regards the maintenance
and advancement of the economic welfare of a people in time of peace
as any less a public purpose than the maintenance and training of a
naval force."
The Court concluded that the principles of sovereign immunity "are
applicable alike to all ships held and used by a government for a
public purpose."'" State traders strongly endorse this view, since
they believe there is no nonpublic activity by a government; there
is no nongovernmental act by government. They believe that to say
7
otherwise is a contradiction.
13. Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
14. In The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 478 (1812), the Court
found the Exchange entitled to sovereign immunity. However, since the Exchange had been
converted into a warship of the French navy, the status of commercial vessels was left undetermined.
15. Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926).
16. Id.
17. The rationale is that immunity applies because government property is not subject to
litigation and under international law is immune from execution. This represents the official
Department of State position. For example, see the exchange of telegrams concerning the
seizure of the Cuban vessel Las Villes in Bilder, Christenson, Cohen, Huang, Kerley, Nilsen,
Reis & Rubin, ContemporaryPractice of the United States Relating to InternationalLaw,
56 AM. J. INT'L L. 526, 528 (1962), and the decision respecting two Cuban aircraft flown to
Florida by defecting pilots. Id. at 529. Section 7 of the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. §
747 (1970), authorizes the Secretary of State to direct consuls to claim immunity for United
States' vessels or cargoes, under the purview of sections 1-4 of that Act, which are seized,
arrested or attached by the process of a foreign court. The section also states that nothing in
it shall prejudice or preclude a claim of immunity "from foreign jurisdiction in a proper case."
At least until the qualifying phrase "in a proper case" is judicially defined, the law appears
to commit the United States to the principle of sovereign immunity with respect to seizures
of government property by foreign sovereigns, provided that there is no overriding treaty
arrangement.
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The position of the state traders simply reflects a realistic appraisal of international relations. Sovereign immunity is not a concept that may be split into two theories of "absolute" and "restrictive" immunities and then forced upon the community of nations.
It is a historically established fact of international power that is not
susceptible of being dealt with argumentatively. It is a facet of
national integrity that may be disregarded only at the risk of disagreeable consequences to the United States and therefore must be
dealt with by negotiation, rather than by taking a stand backed up
by arguments to justify redefining sovereign immunity. The foundation of sovereign immunity derives
from the consideration, that the sovereign power of the nation is
alone competent to avenge wrongs committed by a sovereign, that the
questions to which such wrongs give birth are rather questions of
policy than of law, that they are for diplomatic, rather than legal
discussion. .... 11
Individual national efforts at eliminating the unfairness by a reclassification of sovereign activity based on perceived differences
between commercial and nongovernmental private acts and public
acts are misdirected because they are directed at unilateral action
and fail to involve the express consent of foreign states that retain
the power to retaliate against the imposition of any rule of law to
which they have not given their express consent. The only way the
problem has ever been resolved successfully has been by negotiated
consent. 9 While this may not result in ideal solutions, it must be
18. The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 478, 489 (1812).
19. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Italy, 63 Stat. 2255,
2291-92 (1948), which provides:
No enterprise of either High Contracting Party which is publicly owned or controlled shall, if it engages in commercial, manufacturing, processing, shipping or other
business activities within the territories of the other High Contracting Party, claim or
enjoy, either for itself or for its property, immunity therein from taxation, suit, from
execution of judgment, or from any other liability to which a privately owned and
controlled enterprise is subject therein.
See also Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the Federal Republic of
Germany, October 29, 1954, [1956] 2 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593. It has been reported
that in the ten-year period beginning in 1948 fourteen treaties with similar provisions were
made by the United States. The practice was discontinued after 1958 because of the fear that
such provisions would endanger the United States' ability to plead sovereign immunity in
foreign courts. See Stetser, The Immunity Waiver For State-ControlledBusiness Enterprises
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recognized as a practical necessity. The various types of unilateral
action adopted to date espousing the restrictive theory have not
been successful in enabling litigants to collect any money in response to a judgment as a matter of right, either by compelling
payment of damages or by seizing and selling a foreign state's property without its consent in the same way that a private citizen may
be forced to pay a judgment. Arguments have been made, adjudications have been accomplished, judgments have been rendered and
arbitration has been compelled, but nothing has been paid under
compulsion. 20 Efforts thus far have avoided the necessity of using
political action to negotiate and obtain the consent of foreign states,
so that their state trading agencies could be required to submit to
court decrees and admit an unqualified obligation to respond in
21
damages for adjudicated wrongdoing.
Attempts at relief from the unfair effects of sovereign immunity
have been accomplished when the foreign nation in question has
had attachable property in the United States, by a finding that the
right has been waived.2 2 The waiver is found when there is, in effect,
23
a consent to be sued, or where the sovereign is not really a party,
in United States Commercial Treaties, 1961 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 89, 90.

Short of agreement, section 5 of the Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. § 785 (1970), attempts
to encourage reciprocation by forbidding suits brought by foreigners in American courts
against United States ships "unless it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court in which
suit is brought that said [foreign] government, under similar circumstances, allows nationals
of the United States to sue in its courts." State traders suing in American courts would be
subject to this law.
20. Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d
354 (2d Cir. 1964).
21. But see the legislation proposed in Hearings on H.R. 3493 Before the Subcomm. on
Claims and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong., 1st
Sess., ser. 10 (1973). Section 1602 of the proposed law provides:
[U]nder international law, states are not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign
courts in so far as their commercial activities are concerned, and their commercial
property may be levied upon for the satisfaction of judgment rendered against them
in connection with their commercial activities. ...
Section 1601 of the law would exclude the non-commercial assets of a foreign state from
execution, including certain bank deposits and military funds. Id. at 10-11.
22. See, e.g., Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, Ministry of Commerce, 360 F.2d
103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966); Flota Maritima Browning v. Motor Vessel
Ciudad, 335 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1964); Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General, de
Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964). Petrol Shipping and Victory
Transport involved arbitration agreements.
23. See, e.g., Stephen v. Zivinostenska Banka Nat'l Corp. 15 App. Div. 2d 111, 222
N.Y.S.2d 128 (1961). The court found that some of the assets which were the subject of the
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or where an interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
2
leads to a qualification of the immunity.
Another successful and best known line of relief has been the
Department of State's practice of advising courts of its opinion as
to the merits of a particular claim by a foreign government to sovereign immunity for its agents. In Ex parte Republic of Peru, the
Supreme Court described the practice and the principles involved
in obtaining the approval of the Department of State. 25 A foreign
ship had been seized to enforce a court award. The Court found that
seizure of the property of a friendly foreign nation is such an affront
to its dignity, and may so affect our friendly relations with it, that
the courts must accept the executive determination on the question
of immunity. While the foreign sovereign may present its claim of
immunity to the court, it may also make the same presentation to
the Department of State. The court held that upon recognition and
allowance of the claim by the Department of State and certification
of its action presented to the court by the Attorney General, it is the
court's duty to surrender the vessel and remit the libellant to the
relief obtainable through diplomatic negotiation. 21 While the Department's advisory procedure is referred to as making a "suggestion of immunity," the judicial branch follows the action of the
political branch for the wise, but unstated reason that the political
branch controls both the armed forces and the foreign service personnel. These are the agencies that exercise power in the internalitigation were not within the ambit of the sovereign's immunity and that the transfer in
Czechoslovakia of assets located in the United States was invalid. Id. at 137. See also United
States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gessellschaft, 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929); Wolchok v.
Statni Banka Ceskoslovenska, 15 App. Div. 2d 103, 222 N.Y.S.2d 140 (1961).
24. Kane v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 267 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Pa. 1967)..See also

Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Moore, 345 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1965), in which a mandamus action
was brought to compel Moore, a U.S. marshal, to serve process on the Tunisian ambassador
in a libel in personam action against the Republic of Tunisia; Note, Amenability of Foreign
Sovereigns.to Federal in Personam Jurisdiction,14 VA. J. INT'L L. 487 (1974).
25. 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
26. Southeastern Leasing Corp. v. Stern Dragger Belogorsk, 493 F.2d 1223 (1st Cir. 1974).
The ship was ordered released and the action dismissed after a suggestion of immunity by
the Department of State. Executive action was held not reviewable even in face of an allegedly arbitrary executive decision. In Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974), it was held
that a suggestion of immunity is not only binding on the courts, but is not subject to review
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (Cum. Supp. 1976). The case is
discussed in 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 215 (1974).
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tional field. In Ex parte Republic of Peru,2 Peru presented its claim
by its ambassador through the Department of State, but in other
cases foreign governments have intervened directly in the litiga28
tion.
The Department of State's practice in the intervention cases was
not consistent at first and the results often seemed quite unfair. For
example, a woman passenger injured on a Soviet ship libeled the
ship for her damages, but on the Ambassador's presentation of a
claim of sovereign immunity submitted by the Department of State,
the district court dismissed the case without even an inquiry into
the facts of ownership of the vessel involved.2 1 In response to later
questions about the immunity of Soviet ships, and recognizing the
unfair result for the injured passenger, the Department of State, on
April 9, 1948, announced it was reconsidering its policy in handling
requests for immunity for foreign-owned and operated ships. After
four years of reconsidering, the Department, on May 19, 1952, established its new policy in a letter by its Acting Legal Advisor addressed to the Acting Attorney General 3 (the letter has become
known as the "Tate Letter" for its author, Jack B. Tate), asserted
that the Department had "now reached the conclusion that such
immunity should no longer be granted in certain types of cases." '3'
The reference to "such immunity" was to immunity from suit accorded foreign governments made defendants in the courts of the
United States without their consent, but the types of cases were not
defined other than to be cases involving commercial activity. The
use of the word "granted" suggests that the Department thought it
was conferring or withholding a privilege rather than informing the
courts about a power relationship between the United States and
foreign states. The letter referred to "the existence of two conflicting
concepts of sovereign immunity each widely held and firmly established, 3 2 and concluded "it will hereafter be the Department's pol27. 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
28. Renchard v. Humphreys & Harding, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 382 (D.D.C. 1974). The court
allowed Brazil to be joined as a defendant, after the Department of State decided not to
suggest immunity be given. See also Compania Espanola de Novagacion Maritima v. Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938).
29. Low v. Steamship Rossia, 1948 A.M.C. 814 (S.D.N.Y.).
30. 26 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 984 (1952).
31. Id. at 984.
32. Id.
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icy to follow the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in the
consideration of requests of foreign governments for a grant of sovereign immunity. ' 33 The Acting Attorney General was advised that
future practice would be "to advise you of all requests by foreign
governments for the grant of immunity from suit and the Department's action thereon."" The Acting Legal Advisor may have labored the obvious when he stated that the "shift in policy by the
executive cannot control the courts . . . ." The letter formalized
what had been done before, with the added element that thereafter
the Department would volunteer an opinion to the courts as to
whether the claimant foreign state was engaged in a private or public activity. If the activity was found to be private, the Department
would recommend that the foreign state not be entitled to immunity. Presumably, the Department of Justice would then present its
view and the courts would adjudicate the question with the Department of State's position as a premise. The letter had the defect of
trying to be helpful by giving the appearance of acting in response
to a problem, while not really doing much of anything except stimulate more argument.35 The effectiveness of the Department of
State's new procedure was quickly tested in litigation.
Post-Tate Letter cases have shown that the system of obtaining
Department of State approval on sovereign immunity questions is
33. Id. at 985.
34. Id.
35. Arguments abound. Brandon, Sovereign Immunity of Government-Owned Corporations and Ships, 39 CoRNELL L.Q. 425 (1954). It is argued that between the rival theories of
absolute and restrictive (qualified) sovereign immunity the latter is better and that Pesaro
is based on "increasingly dubious grounds." Id. at 425. See Fensterwald, Sovereign Immunity
and Soviet State Trading, 63 HAv. L. REv. 614, 641 (1950), which suggests a reformation of
judicial thinking. In Cardozo, Sovereign Immunity: The PlaintiffDeserves a Day in Court,
67 HARV. L. REV. 608 (1954), it is asserted that in view of the subtleties of language used by
the Department of State in communicating with the courts, it would be advisable for the
Department to have an internal adjudicative proceeding to decide if a sovereign public act is
involved. In Fensterwald, United States Policies Toward State Trading, 24 L. & CONTEMP.
PROB. 369 (1959), the author notes there is a "schizophrenia within the executive family"
between the Department of State and the Justice Department because the latter hopes "to
have its cake and eat it too" by sticking to the absolute theory while the Department of State
espouses the restrictive theory. Id. at 388-93. It was proposed in Hervey, The Immunity of
Foreign States When Engaged in Commercial Enterprises:A ProposedSolution, 27 MICH. L.
REv. 751 (1929), that Congress expressly declare a resumption of jurisdiction over both the
agents and property of foreign states used in the furtherance of commercial undertakings in
the United States. Id. at 773-75. See notes 18 supra and 49 infra.
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ineffective. In one case,36 a longshoreman sued the U.S.S.R. for
disabling injuries sustained aboard one of its ships in port in Philadelphia. Service was made on its agent and, later, on the Black Sea
State S.S. Line through its local husbanding agent. No one appeared for Black Sea and default judgment for $49,231.92 was rendered. The Department was asked to help in obtaining effective
jurisdiction so that the disabled longshoreman could collect on his
judgment. Nevertheless, and even though the court held service
was valid and jurisdiction was obtained over Black Sea, "[the
plaintiff] has been unable to collect this judgment or any part
37
there of."
Further proof of the ineffectiveness of the State Department approval process came when a ship operator sued to recover for damages caused by a Korean government lighter during unloading at
Pusan. The operator sought to attach Korean funds in New York
banks.3 8 Korea's Ambassador to the United States asked the Department of State to tell the Department of Justice to tell the court
that Korea's funds were immune from attachment. State's letter to
Justice "'requested that a copy of the note of the Ambassador be
presented to the court and that the court be informed of the Department of State's agreement with the contention of the Ambassador
that property of the Republic of Korea is not subject to attachment
in the United States.' ,,31 While the judge called this statement an
"unequivocal" position with respect to Korea's claim of immunity,"
the letter seemed to contradict any such inference. In fact, the Department also wrote that it" 'has not requested that an appropriate
suggestion of immunity be filed, inasmuch as the particular acts out
of which the cause of action arose are not shown to be of purely
governmental character.' "41 These circumlocutions seem to mean
only that as far as the Department of State was concerned the acts
had not been shown to be either governmental or commercial. The
result of the Department's failure to take a definite position was
36. Kane v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 267 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Pa. 1967), afl'd,
394 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1968).
37. Kane v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 394 F.2d 131, 132 (3d Cir. 1968).
38. New York and Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y.
1955).
39. Id. at 685.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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that Korea's funds were immune, just as surely as if Korea had been
granted sovereign immunity in the matter.
A 1961 in rem proceeding illustrates the inappropriateness of a
system of justice that ties litigation in particular suits to timely
political considerations. 42 The M.V. Bahia de Nipe, a Cuban ship
within the definition of a state trader, was on its way to the U.S.S.R.
with a cargo of sugar. The master and ten of the crewmen seized
control on the high seas and directed the ship into Hampton Roads,
Virginia, where they sought political asylum. While the ship was
tied up at Norfolk, three claimants libelled the ship for monetary
claims. Two longshoremen had unsatisfied judgments against Naviera Cuba, a shipping company now owned and operated by the
Cuban government as a state trader; another judgment creditor had
a $500,000 claim and an American company claimed as the uncompensated owner of the sugar on board. The Department of State
asked that the ship be released and the court immediately agreed.
The facts showed a perfect case of commercial activity justifying
nonimmunity and therefore, not subject to release under the terms
of the Tate Letter and the Department's restrictive theory. Added
was the element of the power of possession vis-a-vis a small, unrecognized and disliked state. The district court dealt with the plaintiffs' contention of inconsistency as follows: "The short answer to
these contentions is that no policy with respect to international
relations is so fixed that it cannot be varied in the wisdom of the
Executive.

43

Then the court added this cryptic statement: "In one

final word we must recognize that rapidly changing events in the
world of today compel the executive to take action involving international affairs which in the eyes of the public may seem a bit
strange."" The statement was cryptic and the action of the Executive strange only because the Secretary of State's communication
before the court was less than forthcoming in failing to include all
the relevant facts. Contemporaneous with these proceedings was the
front page news that a hijacked Eastern Airlines Electra aircraft was
on the ground in Cuba and the Executive had been negotiating for
its release. However, in a later case, when Cuba had no bargaining
42. Rich v. Naviera Vacuba S.A., 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va.), afl'd, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir.
1961).
43. Id. at 724.
44. Id. at 726.
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tokens, immunity was denied.45 There is nothing wrong with this
shifting of positions, if viewed in the context of the international
considerations which the Department of State must consider; what
is wrong is tying judgments in particular law suits to international
46
considerations.
Courts are well aware of the difficulties in the Department of
State's efforts to be helpful. In Victory Transport, it was noted by
the court: (1) that the Tate Letter "offers no guide-lines or criteria
for differentiating between a sovereign's private and public acts;"
(2) that courts or commentators have not "suggested a satisfactory
test" and (3) that "conceptually the modern sovereign always acts
for a public purpose."47 To these difficulties must be added the
45. Flota Maritima Browning v. Motor Vessel Ciudad, 335 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1964). A
Cuban ship was proceeded against in a Baltimore shipyard and the court rejected a motion
by Cuba through the Czechslovakian ambassador claiming immunity. The court found that
by entering a general appearance and filing objections, Cuba had waived immunity and
acknowledged jurisdiction. Cuba had waited three years after the complaint was filed before
requesting immunity and the Department of State never suggested immunity be granted.
46. In Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1971), the
Department of State, for no readily apparent reason, failed to follow the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity. The Department suggested immunity be granted to what was obviously
a state trader, when Isbrandtsen Tankers sued the President of India for damages for extra
expenses caused by delays in unloading shipments of grain in India under a charter agreement. By the terms of the charter, disputes between the parties were to be litigated in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York and immunity was
waived. Notwithstanding both the agreement and the commercial nature of the transaction,
the Department of State certified a claim of immunity as requested by the Indian government. Conclusive effect was given to the immunity suggestion in a holding by the court that
certification precluded any inquiry into the question of waiver. See, e.g., Holden v. Australia,
369 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Cal. 1974). But see Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece,
Ministry of Commerce, 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1966) (order compelling arbitration issued when
contract had a waiver clause); Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354 (2d
Cir. 1964) (order compelling arbitration issued in response to a similar clause in a voyage
charter signed by the Spanish General Consul on behalf of the appellant, a branch of the
Spanish Ministry of Commerce).
An unfortunate effect of the Tate Letter was the creation of a false belief among plaintiff's
lawyers that something effective was being done, with resulting empty victories and wasted
expense. See, e.g., Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Moore, 345 F.2d 978, n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1965); McCanahy v. City of London Corp., 381 F. Supp. 728 (D.N.J. 1974), in which the city of London
was declared to be a corporation whose "ancient rights . . .are assured to it by Art. 13 of
the Magna Carta .. " Id. at 729. The court ridiculed the suggestion that it was practical
to bring this sovereign before the court: "It is plain to this court that if the Lord Mayor of
London may exclude Elizabeth II...
from crossing the Temple Bar, he may equally exclude
the U.S. Marshal, the clerk and the U.S. Postal Service, whether the entry be actual or
constructive." Id. at 730.
47. 336 F.2d at 359.
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nonlegal issues encountered in dealing with foreign nations, dictating inconsistent application of the theory. No matter how the issues
are resolved nationally, foreign states will continue to assert their
established power to compel recognition of immunity rights."
The reality of the Department's failures to consistently apply its
policy has been apparent enough for Congress to try its hand at
solving the problem of bringing state traders to account in United
States courts for any wrongdoing, but no legislation has been enacted yet. While a bill was proposed in the ninety-third Congress
and hearings were ordered, the bill was never enacted." The 1973
bill was drafted by the Departments of State and Justice, and transmitted jointly by the Secretary of State and Attorney General to
Congress. It would have transferred to the courts responsibility for
determining whether a state trader is entitled to immunity. There
would have been no more Tate Letter advice or "grant" of immunity
from the Department of State." The transmittal letter acknowledged that legislation is an interim arrangement. "The ideal ar48. To trace the line of cases holding that foreign state-owned corporations are not entitled
to immunity see, e.g., S.T. Tringali Co. v. Tug Pemex XV, 274 F. Supp. 227 (S.D. Tex. 1967);
Plesch v. Banque Nationale, 273 App. Div. 224, 77 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1948); The Beaton-Park,65
F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Wash. 1946); The Uxmal, 40 F. Supp. 258 (D.Mass. 1941); Ulen & Co.
v. Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego, 261 App. Div. 1, 24 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1940); United States v.
Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929); Coale v. Societe CoOperative Suisse des Charbons, 21 F.2d 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); Molina v. Comision Reguladora,
Mercado de Henequen, 91 N.J.L. 382, 103 A. 397 (1918). Contra, Mason v. Intercolonial Ry.,
197 Mass. 349, 83 N.E. 876 (1908); Bradford v. Director General of Railroads, 278 S.W. 251
(Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Dunlap v. Banco Cent., 41 N.Y.S.2d 650 (Sup. Ct. 1943); United
States of Mexico v. Schmuck, 293 N.Y. 264, 56 N.E.2d 577 (1944); Miller v. Ferrocarrill del
Pacifico de Nicaragua, 137 Me. 251, 18 A.2d 688 (1941); F.W. Stone Eng'r Co. v. Petroleos
Mexicanos, 352 Pa. 12, 42 A.2d 57 (1945); Isbrandtsen Co. v. Netherlands East Indies Gov't,
75 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). While the decisions can be explained by differing fact
situations, these are largely rationalizations with little relevance to the essential issues, leaving the decisions hopelessly in conflict. In a third line of cases the courts elected to subject
the issue of immunity to examination by a referee. See, e.g., Telkes v. Hungarian Nat'l
Museum, 265 App. Div. 192, 38 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1942); Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania
Monopolies Institute, 260 App. Div. 189, 20 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1940).
49. S. 566, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). Senator Hruska, in introducing the bill, stated the
objective was "to regulate the jurisdictional immunities of foreign states.
119 CONG.
REc. 2213 (1973).
50. The transmittal letter referred to freeing the Department of State "from pressures by
foreign states to suggest immunity and from any adverse consequences resulting from the
unwillingness of the Department to suggest immunity." Id. at 2215. It continued: "Plaintiffs,
the Department of State, and foreign states would thus benefit from the removal of the issue
of immunity from the realm of discretion and making it a justiciable question." Id.
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rangement concerning the sovereign immunity of foreign states
would be the regulation of the question through a general international agreement."'" The 1973 bill was "looked upon as an arrangement to be applied until such time as a satisfactory convention is
drawn up and the United States becomes a party." 2 While the
objective of such legislation is worthy, the need to get foreign states
to consent to the results of an adjudication will remain. Moreover,
these nations will continue to assert rights they undoubtedly have
under international law to be dealt with as equals by the political
agencies of our government, not the judiciary. Another problem
with such legislative solutions is that they limit effectiveness to
achieve fair results by providing for the continued immunity of
assets of foreign states from execution and attachment. Political
considerations will continue to play an important role. The
U.S.S.R., in fact, has authorized retaliation against foreign states
3
that do not respect Soviet sovereign immunity.
On the other end of United States trading routes, adjudications
set in foreign nations are often bound up with considerations of
national interest. 4 The capacity of judicial agencies of socialist
51. Id. at 2215.
52. This viewpoint seems to be at variance with the reported opposition to using international agreements to relinquish claims of immunity for publicly owned or controlled commercial activities. See note 19 supra.
53. See FRIEDMANN, LiSSITZYN & PUGH, INTERNATIONAL LAW 655 (1969). The U.S.S.R. law
provides:
The bringing of a suit against a foreign state, the [provision of] security for the suit,
and execution upon a foreign state's property within the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics are permissible only with the consent of the competent organs of this [the
foreign] state.
Id. Soviet writers substantiate the absolute immunity position of the U.S.S.R. as follows:
Bourgeois theory and . . . the jurisprudence of various states explain the basis of the
principle of state immunity, which they recognize, in different ways. Some . . .look
upon immunity as a rule of customary law, which arises from its longstanding application in fact. Others . . . see in it an expression of a fundamental principle of
international law-the sovereignty of states. In our opinion, the second basis is the only
correct one. . . .Some bourgeois writers maintain that the rule of immunity implies
a denial of justice. . . .One cannot agree with this assertion. The state can be sued
in its own courts, but in the courts of a foreign state only with its consent.
Id. at 653. Except for the references to "bourgeois" theory, this statement represents the view
in the United States as well.
54. For example, in Delek Israeli Fuel Corp. & Jordan Investments Ltd. v. Soiuznefteksport, 13 ARB. J. 159 (1959), the plaintiff, an Israeli company, claimed a failure to deliver oil
as provided by contract and damages in excess of two million dollars. The claim was arbi-
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states to adjudicate commercial disputes impartially is particularly
limited. The judges are apt to be state employees responsive directly
to the administrative heads of state, and who have little independence as we know the concept since they are answerable for deviations from orthodox political views or international political requirements. Arbitrators will be bound to uphold official policy. Because
of the cultural differences and a history of failures by socialist nations to honor their commercial obligations," it is not expected that
consent by treaties with Soviet or eastern European nations will
come easily or soon. We have deluded ourselves long enough. Revised theories, difficult to apply either by the courts as noted in the
Victory Transport case,56 or by the Department of State as in its
struggles with Cuba, will not produce fair results in settling disputes. There must be express, advance consent as to the procedures
and principles to be followed. The real source of unfair results is the
conduct of foreign states which obtain sovereign immunity in
commercial contexts by either abusing or threatening to abuse the
power they enjoy outside United States jurisdiction.
The differences between western states and socialist states with
respect to a state's responsibility to its citizens and with respect to
wrongdoing and confiscation of property may well defy comprotrated in the U.S.S.R. before its Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission. The failure to deliver
and consequent damages were established as a result of a withdrawal by the Ministry of
Foreign Trade of an export license after partial deliveries had been made. Performance was
affected by the war between Israel and Egypt in November of 1956 and political considerations intruded since the Israeli importer was the government of Israel. The Soviets considered
Israel's actions in the mideast to be aggression and cancelled the contracts in reliance on force
majeure. Id. Under the United States view of contract law, inconvenience or dislike of another
party's political acts is not a justification for breach of contract.
No Soviet witness was allowed to testify on questions of fact at the trial. The Israeli
attorneys were prevented from proving the circumstances as grounds for their claims, an
essential requirement under the Arbitration Commission's rules of procedure. They were thus
denied the opportunity to prove that under Soviet law it is the seller's duty to carry out the
contract under any circumstances. Domke, Arbitration of State-Trading Relations, 24 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 317, 324 (1959).
The case is not to be regarded as isolated or atypical. Rather, it is a precedent for what
may be expected again and again if political pressure or inconvenience is great enough on
state trading nations. J. Cord., Nov. 21, 1974, at 330-32.
55. The history of this problem dates back to the Lend-Lease agreements of the second
world war. Defaulted payment claims were re-negotiated, but the U.S.S.R. has suspended
payments on the final settlement of their World War II Lend-Lease debt. NEWSWEEK, Jan.
27, 1974, at 33.
56. 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964).
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mise.57 Nevertheless, the needs of commerce create pressures for
accommodation. There are several actions that can be taken.
If consent by treaty is not possible for the time being, one way to
progress is to bypass the intractable issue of sovereign immunity
with all its overtones of national interests. Such a way has been
suggested in the statement of Basic Principlesof Relations Between
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics wherein the parties agreed to "encourage" contracting
enterprises to acquiesce in arbitration outside either country. 8
There is ample precedent for such activity.59 The practical effect is
that state traders are now encouraged to use arbitration clauses in
all contracts. 0 To make the agreements effective, damage funds or
security deposits in foreign banks should be established.
Another approach to the problem is to proceed as before, with a
continuation of litigation in United States courts and with the
courts and lawyers struggling with the issues of sovereign immunity
as they have always been doing, but requiring the Department of
State to take an active role in enforcing judgments. The issues
would be resolved in accordance with existing precedents including
the various applications of the absolute and restrictive theories.
After final judgment, the Department of State would be directed to
take speedy, affirmative action to collect any amount of assessed
damages against a foreign state through negotiation or set-off
57. Freeman, Some Aspects of Soviet Influence on InternationalLaw, 62 AM. J. INT'L L.
710, 718 (1968).
The subject of compensation for confiscation of foreign-owned private property is,
of course, part of the larger topic of state responsibility and the diplomatic protection
of citizens abroad. Here the gulf between Western nations and the Soviet group is so
huge as to defy any compromise. . . . Soviet writers have defined an international
delinquency creating responsibility as the commission by a state or its officials, and
also by its citizens with the connivance of its government, of acts violating the rules
of international law and the rights and interests of other states and their citizens.

Id.
58. 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 756 (1972).
59. Domke, Arbitration, 24 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 317 (1959); Domke, The Enforcement of
MaritimeArbitrationAgreements with ForeignGovernments, 2 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 617 (1971).
60. The Supreme Court has held that American companies that have signed arbitration
agreements abroad cannot bring their charges into United States courts, but must submit to
foreign arbitration. Scherck v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). This case interprets
the Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970), and the "full disclosure" provisions
of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1970). See also Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Camden
Fibre Mills, Inc., 304 N.Y. 519, 109 N.E.2d 606 (Ct. App. 1952).
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against any funds payable by the United States to foreign states
when collection is otherwise impossible. Exceptions would be made
when the Department is willing to certify that the best interests of
the United States require allowing a default, giving the reasons for
such a conclusion. Amounts collected in response to judgments
would be paid to winning litigants by the United States government
through the adjudicating court. Under this program the Department should take an active role in helping persons who have relied
on the judicial process for effective and fair adjudication. If United
States courts adjudge someone liable for damages the entire
resources of the government should be available to assure collection
and there should be a determined pursuit of assets until the rights
of successful litigants are paid in full. The present stand-off attitude
is not appropriate.
A third suggested solution also by-passes the immunity issue by
having claims assumed by the United States and prosecuted by the
Department of State through negotiation. This method avoids all
the issues of relative equality between states and private citizens
when they have to plead on terms of equality before our courts.
Claims would have to be evaluated, but once a claim is found to be
valid, evaluation could be made in the ensuing negotiations as facts
are developed.
Whatever way is chosen, it should be clear that judicial efforts are
bound to be less than satisfactory if immunity is an issue. This is
so because only the Department of State, as an agency of national
power, can negotiate effectively with a foreign nation. Now is the
time to move if the United States is to take advantage of the detente
with socialist countries particularly in view of the increase in commercial activity. If a Trade Act is enacted, a slow increase of mutual
interest in commercial exchanges is inevitable.6' As commercial ex61. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2101 et seq. (Curi. Supp. 1976). Mr. George Kennan, a former ambassador to the U.S.S.R., has written:
Dealings by American firms with a foreign governmental trade monopoly require constant scrutiny and a minimal degree of governmental regulation to assure that they
do not proceed to the detriment of the national interest. Such is the fragmentation of

authority within the Executive Branch that our government is today poorly constituted
to meet this responsibility. The firms need and deserve a single authoritative center

somewhere in the government where they can be told promptly and consistently what
they can and cannot do in dealing with the Russians. This center should be located in
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changes with state traders increase, there will be an increase in
conflict over performance of transactions, and a better means must
be found to resolve the conflicts. A dispute settlement procedure is
as important to commerce as sales efforts, financing and document
processing. The main thought behind this article is that the sooner
the United States gets away from disputes over principles and finds
a practical way to settle commercial disputes, the sooner conflicts
will be settled with fairness to all parties involved. The Department
of State should be the authoritative center in this effort. Far from
being free from pressures by foreign states, the Department of State
should be the focal point of such pressures; and far from removing
the issue from the realm of discretion, it should be a responsibility
of the Department to use its discretion in deciding where the nation's interests are in these controversies.
the Department of State, as the agency with the widest and deepest responsibility for
the conduct of our foreign relations. . ..
The Washington Post, Dec. 18, 1974, § A, at 14, col. 3.

